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Who's Your Daddy?: An Analysis of Illinois' Law of
Parentage and the Meaning of Parenthood
By Steven N. Peskind*
I. INTRODUCTION
Should genetic considerations trump all other considerations in
determining parentage? Except in very few instances, Illinois'
parentage law answers yes to this question, despite a dramatic
sociological and technological revolution marginalizing traditional
biology-based notions of parentage. In an era where science allows the
creation of children using the eggs of an intended mother combined
with the sperm of a stranger implanted into the uterus of another
woman, a new paradigm is necessary. This paradigm is not limited to
the unique set of circumstances presented above; instead, it has a more
universal application across the entire spectrum of parentage law in
Illinois. The notion of mandating parentage on biology is based upon
an antiquated family law model that views children as property.
Contrary to the ubiquitous notions of a "best interest of the children"
standard in family law, this biological parentage model disregards any
considerations of a child's best interest.
In such a complex era, it is simply wrong for a court to be divested of
the opportunity to determine parentage without considering a child's
interests. As the renowned ethicist and social scholar Thomas Murray
succinctly noted:
Emphasizing biological parenthood undervalues all other forms of
parenthood-the many adults, related or unrelated, who raise children.
It gives inadequate acknowledgement to the love and loyalty that can
develop between rearing adults and the children who flourish under
their care. It reflects and reinforces old models of the child-parent
relationship that we would otherwise firmly reject-models like the
child as property. It has thoroughly repugnant implications, for
* Steven N. Peskind is an attorney who concentrates his practice in the area of family law in
Geneva, Illinois. He received his B.A. degree at Tulane University and his J.D. degree at DePaul
College of Law. He currently is the co-chair of the Illinois State Bar Association Family Law
Section Council, Reproductive Technology Subcommittee.
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example, that a rapist has rights with respect to the child created as a
result of his assault: the right to block an adoption, to rear the child, or
to profit should the child later have good fortune. 1
Parentage law should reject this worn model, in which biology
exclusively determines parentage, in favor of a model that focuses
instead on children's interests. While considerations of biological
connection should not be disregarded completely, they likewise should
not be absolute. This Article will commence with an examination of the
current Illinois statutory model of determining parentage of both
children born into intact marriages and children born to unmarried
parents and additionally will cover the disestablishment of parentage. 2
This Article will then explore the possible constitutional3 and public
policy problems engendered by the current statutes 4 and will conclude
with specific concrete recommendations as to how Illinois' statutory
law can more accurately address the needs of Illinois children and
families in this twenty-first century. 5
II. ILLINOIS STATUTORY BASIS OF PARENTAGE
A. Married Parents
Pursuant to the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (as amended, the
"Illinois Parentage Act"), 6 a parent-child relationship is defined as "the
legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or adoptive
parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges,
duties, and obligations. It includes the mother and child relationship
and the father and child relationship." 7  From the language of the
statute, it is clear that the parent-child relationship is not dependent
upon the marriage of the parents, and children born to married versus
unmarried parents should be treated equally. 8 Noticeably absent from
1. THOMAS H. MURRAY, THE WORTH OF A CHILD 45 (1996).
2. See infra Part II (discussing the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 and Illinois case law relating
to the determination of parentage).
3. See infra Part III (discussing the constitutional issues affecting parents and their rights to
parent their children).
4. See infra Part IV (discussing changes in Illinois adoption laws as a result of the Baby
Richard case).
5. See infra Parts V-VI (examining the problems posed by modern methods of paternity
testing and suggesting changes to the Illinois statutes).
6. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1-45/27 (2002).
7. Id. § 45/2.
8. Id. § 45/3 ("The parent and child relationship, including support obligations, extends
equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents."); see
also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968) (maintaining that discrimination against
illegitimate children is constitutionally impermissible pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of
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this definition of a parent-child relationship is any reference to the
genetic connection between a parent and a child.
1. Presumptions of Parentage
The provisions pertaining to the presumptions of the parenthood of a
child born into an intact marriage are found in section 5 of the Illinois
Parentage Act.9 If a child is born to an intact marriage, the husband is
presumed to be the father of the child.10 If, subsequent to the child's
birth, the mother marries a man who was listed on the child's birth
certificate, he likewise would be presumed the father of the child.11 The
aforesaid presumptions are rebuttable upon a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that another man is the biological father. 12 If the
presumption is in fact rebutted, paternity of the biological father may be
established through an action to determine parentage. 13 Accordingly,
once displaced by the biological father, the husband and presumed
father no longer would have any parentage rights independent of those
possessed by his wife, the child's mother. 14
While a presumed father may not have any rights to secure the
permanence of his relationship with the child under the statutory
scheme, the statute does provide certain rights of notice separate from
those rights independently possessed by the mother and child.
Specifically, the statute requires that notice be provided to the presumed
father in the same manner that summons are served in other
proceedings, or in lieu of personal service, specific notice as proscribed
in the Notice to Presumed Father statute. 15 The purpose of the notice is
to advise the presumed father of the pendency of the parentage action of
another seeking to be declared the father of his child. 16 The notice
requirement also allows the presumed father to participate in DNA
testing to determine the biological father of the child. 17  While a
the Fourteenth Amendment); Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L.
REv. 477, 483-89 (1967) (discussing the Equal Protection Clause and its relationship to
legitimate children).
9. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5.
10. Id. § 45/5(a)(1).
I1. Id. § 45/5(a)(2).
12. Id. § 45/5(b).
13. Id. § 45/7(b) ("After the presumption that a man presumed to be the father under
subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(2) of Section 5 has been rebutted, paternity of the child by another man
may be determined in the same action, if he has been made a party.").
14. Id.
15. Id. § 45/9.1.
16. Id. § 45/9.1 (b).
17. Id.
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presumed father must be notified of the action and its ramifications, his
rights are still limited to his biological connection (or lack thereof),
regardless of the length of time he has spent raising the child, or his
emotional and psychological bond with the child.18
Significantly, under the Illinois statutory scheme, inasmuch as no
parentage order would be acquired by a typical married couple, both
because of the legal presumption and the lack of necessity, the husband
in an intact marital relationship is the individual most at risk for an
involuntary deprivation of parental rights. 19 If a parentage action is
brought by another man seeking to be declared the father, the husband
has no standing to challenge the marital interloper, absent any biological
connection. This statutory framework is ironic in that public policy and
constitutional considerations would seem to favor raising a child in an
intact family, by married parents who jointly desire to raise the child.
Yet, if another man who happens to be the "DNA dad" wants to assert
his rights, the husband and social father is deprived automatically of his
role as parent without any defense.20 This problem will be discussed
below in greater detail.2 1
B. Unmarried Parents
1. Involuntary Determination of Parentage
If the mother is not married to the biological father at the time of the
child's birth, the Parentage Act allows the father's parentage to be
determined through a number of means. 22  First, parentage can be
determined involuntarily through a petition to declare a father-child
relationship. 23  The putative father, the mother, the child, and the
Illinois Department of Public Aid, if it is providing support for the
child, all have standing to bring a petition for determination of a father-
child relationship pursuant to chapter 750, act 45, section 7 of the
Illinois Compiled Statutes. 24 The child, if a minor, can only bring the
18. See id. § 45/7(b).
19. See id.
20. See id. § 45/7.
21. See infra Part II.B.1 (noting that regardless of any other considerations, the Illinois
Parentage Act declares the biological father the legal father of a child, disallowing any
considerations of the best interest of children in determining parentage).
22. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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action through a guardian ad litem. 25 The action is barred if brought
more than two years after the child reaches the age of majority. 26
The court is prohibited statutorily from conducting a best interest
hearing to determine whether the adjudication of parentage is in the
child's best interest.27 The statute provides for a determination of
parentage exclusively in the context of biology. 28 In J.S.A. v. M.H., an
Illinois Appellate Court decision from the Third District, the court
confirmed the notion that a trial court is statutorily prohibited from
conducting a best interest hearing prior to adjudicating parentage. 29
Justice Lytton, writing for the majority, asserted that "paternity
determinations should turn on the best interest of the child."3 °
However, the court continued by commenting on the constraints the
legislature regrettably placed upon it:
The Act itself does not explicitly provide for a best interest hearing at
any time during the proceedings. If parentage determinations are to be
made under the best interest standard, the legislature must amend the
Act to provide for a best interest hearing. The law, as it exists today,
fails to protect the child's best interests in parentage determinations. 31
A close reading of J.S.A. reflects the court's frustration, if not
outright anger, with the current statutory scheme. The special
concurrences by both Justice McDade and Justice Barry emphasize the
importance of considering children's best interests. 32  Yet, while the
court may lament the legislature's disregard of children's interests, the
statute does not afford a trial court the opportunity to qualitatively
examine whether a finding of parentage furthers those interests. 33
Pervasive notions of children's interests that permeate the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act 34 and the Adoption Act35 are
25. Klak v. Skellion, 741 N.E.2d 288, 290 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000) (indicating that a
minor child seeking to initiate a parentage action must be represented by a guardian ad litem, as a
duly appointed legal representative, in order to prosecute the action).
26. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8.
27. J.S.A. v. M.H., 797 N.E.2d 705,708-09 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2003).
28. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/11.
29. J.S.A., 797 N.E.2d at 708-09. But see In re Marriage of Slayton, 685 N.E.2d 1038, 1044
(I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1997) (using the best interest standard in concluding that an ex-husband
could have reasonable visitation rights).
30. J.S.A., 797 N.E.2d at 709 (citing In re Custody of D.A., 558 N.E.2d 1355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1990)).
31. See id.
32. See id. at 710 (McDade, J., concurring); id. at 710-11 (Barry, J., concurring).
33. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7.
34. Id. §§ 5/101-5/802 (2002 & West Supp. 2003).
35. Id. §§ 50/0.01-50/24 (2002).
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conspicuously absent from statutory provisions that determine who
should be afforded the opportunity to parent a child.
2. Determination of Paternity by Consent
The Parentage Act also allows for the establishment of a parent-child
relationship by consent, through an administrative proceeding in
accordance with the Vital Records Act ("VRA") or the Illinois Public
Aid Code. 36 Procedurally, a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity is
signed at the time of the child's birth.37 Section 12(5) of the VRA
provides specific requirements for a determination of parentage in
accordance with the VRA.38 The VRA permits the administrative
determination of parentage where the mother is unmarried, or where the
mother is married at conception or at the time of the child's birth and
the husband is not the biological father of the child.39  The written
acknowledgment of parentage at the birth of the child has the same
effect as a judgment for paternity. 40  The VRA also allows for the
execution of a denial of parentage if a presumed father is not the
biological father.4 1
Aet i.so, the Parentage Act provides that a parent-child relationship may
be established by consent in the event of a surrogacy relationship if the
following conditions are met:
1. The surrogate mother certifies she is not the biological mother
and that she is carrying the child of the biological father and biological
mother;
2. The husband, if any, of the surrogate certifies that he is not the
biological father;
3. The biological mother certifies she donated the egg to be carried
by the surrogate;
4. The biological father certifies that he donated the sperm from
which the child being carried was conceived;
36. Id. § 45/6. See generally 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12 (2002) (setting forth the VRA's
provisions for determining parentage); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-17.7 (2002) (providing Illinois
Public Aid Code requirements concerning administrative determinations of paternity). The
Parentage Act states, "A parent and child relationship may be established voluntarily by the
signing and witnessing of a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage in accordance with Section
12 of the Vital Records Act or Section 10-17.7 of the Illinois Public Aid Code." 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 45/6(a).
37. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(a).
38. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(5).
39. Id. § 535/12(4).
40. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6.
41. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(5).
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5. A licensed physician certifies all of the information in
paragraphs (1)-(4) above is accurate; and
6. All of the certifications are to be in writing on forms proscribed
by the Department of Public Health and executed prior to the birth of
the child.42
In the event that the aforesaid consents are not executed properly, the
surrogate and her husband are presumed to be the parents; however, the
presumption can be rebutted.43 Ironically, this statute, which creates a
presumption in favor of the surrogate as opposed to the biological
parents, is an exception to the exclusive reliance on biology found in the
Illinois Parentage Act.44 Accordingly, a wife's egg fertilized by her
husband's sperm and implanted in the surrogate presumptively would
be recognized as the child of the surrogate and her husband.45 This
statutory presumption is in favor of the surrogate and her husband
despite the fact that they have no biological connection to the child.
Why the legislature inconsistently emphasizes biology in ordinary
parentage situations and de-emphasizes it in surrogacy relationships is a
curious irony.
The proper execution of an acknowledgment or denial of parentage
conclusively establishes the parent-child relationship except under two
circumstances. The acknowledgment of parentage may be rescinded
upon the earlier of (1) sixty days after the date that the acknowledgment
of parentage is signed or (2) the date of an administrative or judicial
proceeding relating to the child in which the signatory is a party.4 6
Additionally, pursuant to the statute, the acknowledgment can be
challenged in court "only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact, with the burden of proof upon the challenging party." 47
3. Disestablishment of Paternity
It would appear from the direct language of the statute that an
acknowledgement, even if it names the incorrect biological father,
would not be subject to attack except within the parameters set forth
therein (i.e., a showing of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact).
However, a recently decided appellate court case from the Second
District held that the acknowledgment can be vacated pursuant to a
petition to disestablish the parent-child relationship brought pursuant to
42. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(a)(1).
43. Id. § 45/6 (a)(2).
44. See id. § 45/7.
45. See id. § 45/6(a)(2).
46. Id. § 45/5(b).
47. Id. § 45/6(d).
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chapter 750, act 45, section 7(b-5) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes
without such a showing.48 In People v. Smith, the court reversed a trial
court's dismissal of a petition to declare the non-existence of the parent-
child relationship brought after a voluntary acknowledgment established
the relationship. 49 In this case of first impression, the court held that the
disestablishment provision applied to voluntary acknowledgments as
well as court-decreed paternity judgments. 50
Pursuant to both the Parentage Act and case law interpreting the Act,
all determinations of parentage are subject to attack and vacation if
biology belies the actual parentage order.5 1  Accordingly, both the
administrative consent and judicial decree of parentage or divorce,
incorporating findings of parentage, are subject to attack. Courts
struggled with the issues of relitigation of prior paternity judgments
before 1991, when the Parentage Act was amended to allow
disestablishment of parentage based upon a DNA-based identity test
showing no biological connection. 52 This struggle reflects the problem
of a court-decreed parent varying from the actual biological parent.
In Simcox v. Simcox, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the issue
of the finality of a paternity judgment. 53  In that case, a divorce
proceeding provided that the mother's husband was the father of her
minor child. 54  The mother then remarried. 55  Pursuant to Illinois
parentage laws, the child then brought an action to declare the mother's
second husband his father.56 The mother's first husband filed a motion
to dismiss the action, arguing that it was barred by principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, as he was declared the father in the
dissolution proceeding. 57  The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that
children are not legal extensions of their parents and have independent
legal rights. 58  Accordingly, since the child was not a party to the
divorce, the preclusive effects of collateral estoppel and res judicata did
48. People v. Smith, 797 N.E.2d 172, 177 (I1. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2003).
49. Id. at 179.
50. Id. at 178.
51. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b-5); Smith, 797 N.E.2d at 177 (allowing party to bring cause
of action to declare non-existence of parentage that was supported by DNA evidence).
52. Act of Sept. 7, 1990, Pub. Act No. 86-1339, § 1, 1990 Ill. Laws 2648, 2648-52 (amending
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/11).
53. Simcox v. Simcox, 546 N.E.2d 609, 611 (11. 1989).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 612.
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not apply.59 Yet, the court was unclear whether, if the child were
represented by a guardian ad litem in the dissolution proceeding, the
child would have been bound by the parentage finding in the divorce
judgment.60  In Justice Ryan's concurrence, he addressed this
ambiguity:
I do not intend to convey the impression that I would have favored a
similar holding had an attorney or guardian ad litem been appointed
for the child in the dissolution proceeding. Such a case, in my mind,
would have presented a different question, the resolution of which
must be reserved for another day.61
While the Illinois Supreme Court has not spoken to the issue of the
binding effect of a guardian ad litem's presence in a proceeding where a
paternity order is rendered, the First District Appellate Court in In re
Griesmeyer did in fact address the issue of the preclusive effects that
may arise when the child is represented in a dissolution of marriage
action. 62 In Griesmeyer, a mother on behalf of her minor child filed a
paternity action against both her former husband and current husband.
63
The mother argued that a child has "an unqualified statutory entitlement
to determine the identity of her biological father under the Illinois
Parentage Act of 1984 ."64 The question of law presented for review
was
whether or not the fact that a minor child was represented by an
attorney and guardian ad litem in an ultimately uncontested
dissolution proceeding in which the wife had originally disputed the
husband's paternity, precludes the relitigation of the issue of parentage
59. Id.
60. Id. at 612. The presence of a guardian ad litem, the legal representative for the child,
would have theoretically made the paternity order binding upon the child, thus strengthening the
argument that the prior judgment should have been recognized under the theories of res judicata
and collateral estoppel. Id.
61. Id. (Ryan, J., concurring).
62. In re Griesmeyer, 707 N.E.2d 72, 73 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998).
63. Id. at 72. The child had been born during the first marriage. Id. At the time she divorced
her first husband, the mother denied that the husband was the father of her child. Id. at 73. The
court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the child. Id. Ultimately, an uncontested
judgment for dissolution of marriage was entered declaring that the child was "born as a result of
the marriage." Id.
More than a year later, the mother filed a parentage petition against her second husband,
claiming he was the biological father of the child. Id. at 74. The first husband and declared
father filed a motion to dismiss based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Id. In response,
the mother argued that since the child was neither in privity with the mother nor a party to the
divorce case, the principle of collateral estoppel does not apply. Id. The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss and an appeal ensued. Id.
64. Id. at 74.
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in a subsequent action brought by the wife on behalf of said minor
child.6 5
The appellate court in Griesmeyer commenced its analysis by
distinguishing the case from Simcox.66 The appellate court noted that a
public guardian had been appointed to represent the child in the divorce
case.67  The court continued by reviewing other post-Simcox decisions
for guidance. 68  The court paid particular attention to Justice Cook's
reasoning in a dissent from the Fourth District Appellate Court in In re
A.K 6 9 and Justice Cook's majority decision in In re Marriage of
Mesecher.70 In both decisions, Justice Cook invoked the doctrine that
legal representation of a person establishes that person as a party or in
privity for the purposes of res judicata. 71
In Griesmeyer, since the appointment of a guardian ad litem
introduced the child as a party to the action, the court held that
"relitigation of the minor's paternity in this parentage petition is barred
by the prior, uncontested judgment of dissolution where the minor was
represented by a guardian ad litem during the dispute over the minor's
paternity." 72 The Griesmeyer court reasoned that the appointment of
the guardian ad litem as the child's representative would be a
65. Id. at 73.
66. Id. at 75.
67. Id. at 76-77.
68. Id. at 73 (citing In re Rodgers, 665 N.E.2d 36, 39 (Il. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1996), in which
the court held that a subsequent paternity action was not barred where a child did not have a
guardian ad litem in the first action; Draper v. Truitt, 621 N.E.2d 202, 206 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1993, in which the court held that a second paternity petition brought against the same man was
barred when it was adjudicated on its merits and dismissed in the first proceeding; In re
Parentage of Mayberry, 584 N.E.2d 533, 536 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1991), where the court found
that a minor child's parentage action was not barred by the mother's and putative father's cash
settlement without acknowledgement of paternity; Department of Public Aid ex rel. Skelton v.
Liesman, 578 N.E.2d 310, 310 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991), in which the court held that the
Illinois Department of Public Aid should not be barred from pursuing the putative father despite a
prior action against a different alleged father where the child was not joined in the first action;
and In re Marriage of Klebs, 554 N.E.2d 298, 300 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990), where the court
barred a mother from bringing a later parentage case when an adjudication of parentage was made
in the divorce).
69. In re A.K., 620 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1993) (Cook, J., dissenting)
(noting that when a child is represented by a guardian ad litem, the child is a party to the
dissolution).
70. In re Marriage of Mesecher, 650 N.E.2d 294, 297 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1995) (holding
that res judicata will not bar an action against a person who was not a party to the first action).
71. In re A.K., 620 N.E.2d at 579 (Cook, J., dissenting); In re Marriage of Mesecher, 650
N.E.2d at 297.
72. In re Griesmeyer, 707 N.E.2d at 79.
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meaningless appointment if the guardian did not serve as the voice of
the child in the proceeding.
73
The applicability of Griesmeyer was limited by the subsequent
disestablishment amendment 74 as well as the limited occasions in which
the particular facts presented in the case arise. 75 In its amended form,
chapter 750, act 45, section 7(b-5) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes
allows an action to avoid a prior adjudication of paternity (regardless of
the presence of a guardian ad litem) under certain circumstances.
76
Nevertheless, the court's analysis is important in its reaffirmation of the
concept that the child's best interests should be considered in
determining parentage. 77 The court, in dicta, discussed how the child's
best interest might impact parentage, stating that "[a] paternity
determination is not always in the best interest of the child. Such [a]
decision necessarily must rest on myriad factors that cannot be
encompassed in one per se rule of law."78 Both common sense and
constitutional principles 79 support the court's comments despite the fact
that the Parentage Act refuses to recognize these principles. The
decision also reemphasizes that children are not legal extensions of their
parents and that their independent legal rights should be recognized.
80
The Parentage Act, amended in 1991 to allow for the
disestablishment of the parent-child relationship, has been interpreted to
require a DNA test as a prerequisite to the filing of such an action.81 In
Lubbs, the Third District Appellate Court held that the procurement of a
DNA test in advance of the filing of the petition for adjudication was
necessary to sustain the petition.82 The court based its determination
upon a plain reading of the statute and the legislative intent.83 In 2001,
73. Id.
74. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b-5) (2002).
75. See supra note 63 (discussing the facts of Griesmeyer).
76. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 4517(b-5).
An action to declare the non-existence of the parent and child relationship may be
brought subsequent to an adjudication of paternity in any judgment by the man
adjudicated to be the father pursuant to the presumptions in Section 5 of this Act, if, as
a result of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests, it is discovered that the man adjudicated
to be the father is not the natural father of the child.
Id.
77. See Griesmeyer, 707 N.E.2d at 79.
78. Id. at 78.
79. See infra Part III (discussing the constitutional underpinnings of the rights of parents to
raise children).
80. See Griesmeyer, 707 N.E.2d at 78.
81. See In re Marriage of Lubbs, 730 N.E. 2d 1139, 1142 (111. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2000).
82. Id. at 1142-43.
83. Id.
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the Illinois Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Kates reaffirmed this
principle. 84
In Kates, the high court adopted the reasoning of the Third District
Appellate Court in In re Marriage of Lubbs.85 The father litigants in
both Lubbs and Kates argued that it was unfair to require in advance the
presentation of a DNA test without allowing an order compelling
cooperation of the mother and the child.86 In rejecting those pleas, the
court found the requirement not unreasonable. 87  "Given that section
7(b-5) creates a new cause of action that jeopardizes the finality of
paternity adjudications, it is not unreasonable that the legislature chose
to limit such an action to only those adjudicated fathers who first
obtained DNA tests disproving patemity." 88
Specifically, the court asserted policy considerations in favor of the
strict construction of the language in the statute. 89 The court, quoting
from the Massachusetts case of Paternity of Cheryl, commented on the
deleterious policy considerations of reopening judgments: 90 "[A]n
attempt to undo a determination of paternity is potentially devastating to
a child who has considered the man to be the father."9 1
While the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged the legislature's
prerogative within constitutional confines to allow reopening paternity
judgments, the court found that the legislature intended to allow
reopening of only those cases in which the DNA tests were done in
advance. 92 Justice McMorrow, writing for the majority, clearly was
uncomfortable with the notion of vacating prior paternity judgments. 93
Her decision strains to validate the legislative intent and highlights the
special problems inherent in vacating paternity judgments. 94 While
Justice McMorrow rationalized her decision upon the fact that DNA
84. In re Marriage of Kates, 761 N.E.2d 153, 163 (I11. 2001).
85. Id. at 157.
86. Id. at 158.
87. Id. at 163.
88. Id. at 162.
89. Id. at 157.
90. Id. at 161 (citing Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 495-96 (Mass. 2001)).
91. Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 495-96 (Mass. 2001) (internal quotations omitted)
(maintaining that the legislature did not intend the law to allow a father to decide at any time
convenient to him whether to enter or dissolve a paternity agreement).
92. Kates, 761 N.E.2d at 157.
93. See id. at 161 (stating that "section 7(b-5) essentially runs counter to the strong judicial
policy favoring finality of judgments, a policy that applies with special force to adjudication of
paternity, given the impact of such adjudications on the interest of children").
94. See id.
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tests are required in advance of the petition,95 thus presumably limiting
the circumstances in which paternity could be disestablished, because of
scientific advancements in DNA this limitation is actually illusory:
In the last five years, however, much has changed. Testing can now
be done by simple cheek swab (rather than drawing blood), only the
man and the child need be tested (eliminating the need for the
mother's cooperation), and test results are highly dispositive.
Moreover, testing kits are now available on the Internet, eliminating
the need for any medical or court intervention. As a result, more
paternity disestablishment actions are being brought ... 96
Not only is it troubling that courts cannot consider children's interests
in determining parentage but to take an existing relationship between a
father and a child and sever it without considering the impact is
unconscionable. In Kates, the Illinois Supreme Court tried to fashion
remedies consistent with the statute to ameliorate the harshness of
disestablishment, 97 but the fact remains that the legislature has deemed
it advisable public policy to allow an automatic reconsideration of
paternity if a parent's DNA does not match the child's. The
fundamental issue was summarized by Professor Paula Roberts in her
article for the Center for Law and Social Policy: "At what point should
the truth about genetic parentage outweigh the consequences of leaving
a child fatherless? ' 98
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PARENTAGE ACT
It is clear that the legislature has adopted the cult of science as its
ultimate standard in determining who should be a parent in Illinois. It is
questionable, however, whether that scheme is constitutional.
Arguably, the answer is no. Specifically, section 7 of the Illinois
Parentage Act allows an individual alleging that he is the father of a
child to assert parental rights regardless of any competing interests by a
presumed or social father who may have parented a child for a period of
time.99 One legitimately could assert that this statute is abhorrent to
fundamental values that underlie our society inasmuch as it allows the
automatic invasion of an intact family by a stranger. The statute also
discriminates against illegitimate children raised by a father only to be
deprived of that father-child relationship if subsequently it is determined
95. Id. at 161-62.
96. Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part L Disestablishing the Paternity of Non-
marital Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 35, 37-38 (2003) (citations omitted).
97. See Kates, 761 N.E.2d at 157-58.
98. Roberts, supra note 96, at 38.
99. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7 (2002).
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that the man they considered their father is not connected biologically to
them.
The effect of section 7 is to place a judge's robe on the DNA lab
technician, thus depriving courts of the ability to determine parentage in
accordance with the best interests of a child. Take, for example, a
situation in which a presumed father has raised and supported a child he
thought was his for ten years. Another individual claiming to be the
father can file a petition under this statute and displace the presumed
father as the legal father if his DNA proves he is the biological father.
Such a zero-sum situation is intolerable.
This statute thus allows an interloper to invade the marital
relationship and impugn its integrity. Such a fundamental cornerstone
of our society should not be subject to attack automatically because of
nothing more than a stranger's mere biological connection to a child.
While the United States Supreme Court recognizes the right of a
biological parent to a relationship with a child, 100 that right is not
absolute and should not inevitably trump those of the family and
deprive the child of a relationship with a father who raised him.
A. Law Regarding Family Right of Privacy
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of the life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."101 The Due Process Clause also
includes a substantive component that "provides heightened protection
against government interference with certain fundamental liberty
interests." 102
It is indisputable that families enjoy a constitutionally protected right
against untoward state interference. Specifically, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that families enjoy a right of privacy and
liberty. 10 3 The Fourteenth Amendment provides restraints on a state's
ability to legislate untoward invasions on personal liberty:
Without doubt [the Due Process Clause] denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
100. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-652 (1972).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
102. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 720 (1997); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993)). The Court held that "the Due
Process Clause does not permit a state to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make
child-rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a better decision could be made."
Id. at 71-72.
103. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965).
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knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
104
Unlike the protections afforded to the family, individuals engaged in
extramarital relationships have not been afforded constitutional
protections. In Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, the United
States Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari and review a decision
sustaining the termination of employees of a public library for living
together in an adulterous relationship.
10 5
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the United States Supreme Court held
that a biological father does not have an absolute right to establish
paternity if the child was the result of an adulterous relationship. 10 6 In
Michael H., a biological father challenged a California statute that
irrebutably presumed that a child born during an intact marriage was the
child of the husband. 10 7 The biological father in the case argued that his
rights of due process were violated so far as the statute denied him a
relationship with his biological progeny.10 8
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, held that the California
statute, which irrebutably presumed the paternity of a husband
regardless of a biological connection, did not violate the Constitution:
[The biological father] reads the landmark case of Stanley v. Illinois
and the subsequent cases ... as establishing that a liberty interest is
created by biological fatherhood plus an established parental
relationship-factors that exist in the present case as well.... As we
view them, they rest not upon such isolated factors but upon the
historic respect-indeed sanctity would not be too strong a term-
traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the
unitary family .... "Our decisions establish that the Constitution
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of
the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' 109
The Court thus specifically found that the liberty interest, or due
process protection of the family, trumped the interests of the biological
father in maintaining a relationship with the child. 110 Specifically, the
right of the family to avoid rupture in these circumstances is a
104. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis added).
105. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052, 1052 (1978) (denying certiorari).
106. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (plurality opinion).
107. Id. at 115 (plurality opinion).
108. Id. at 115-16 (plurality opinion).
109. Id. at 123-24 (plurality opinion) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977) (Powell, J., plurality opinion)).
110. Id. (plurality opinion).
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constitutionally protected right pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. 111
In final support of its holding, the plurality dramatically commented
on the zero-sum nature of these types of proceedings, in which the
success of the biological father in establishing parentage automatically
excludes the marital father. 112  In noting this consequence, the Court
pointedly commented:
Here, to provide protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny
protection to a marital father, and vice versa .... One of them will
pay a price... Michael by being unable to act as father of the child he
has adulterously begotten, or Gerald by being unable to preserve the
integrity of the traditional family unit he and Victoria have
established. 113
Clearly, the Court was not sympathetic to the claims of the adulterer
displacing those of the innocent husband.
More recently, the United States Supreme Court addressed the notion
of family rights of privacy in its landmark decision of Troxel v.
Granville.1 14 In that case, the Court struck down a Washington State
statute that permitted visitation rights to persons other than parents. 115
The specific litigants in Troxel were grandparents who petitioned the
children's mother for visitation of their grandchildren. 116
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, affirmed the lower court's
decision. 117 She commenced her analysis by noting that "[t]he liberty
interest.., of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children... is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by the Court." 118 The Washington statute, which afforded
no consideration of the parent's preference concerning the child's
associations, allowed a court to overturn any parental decision by a fit
11. Id. at 128 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
112. See id. at 130 (plurality opinion).
113. Id. (plurality opinion).
114. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). When the grandparents' son, the father of their
grandchildren, died, and the grandchildren's mother wished to restrict the grandparents' visitation
with their grandchildren, the grandparents filed suit under a Washington state statute that
permitted visitation rights to persons other than parents. Id. at 60-61. Consequently, the mother
challenged the statute as an unconstitutional interference with her parental decision-making
rights. Id. at 63. The Washington State Supreme Court agreed and held that the statute
unconstitutionally infringed on parents' fundamental right to rear their children. Id. The Court
reasoned that the U.S. Constitution permits a state to interfere with this right only to prevent harm
or potential harm to a child. Id.
115. Id. at 61.
116. Id. at 60.
117. Id.at75.
118. Id. at 65.
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custodian concerning visitation. 119  Accordingly, the statute
impermissibly invaded the parent's natural and constitutionally
protected right of decision-making. 120 The Court held that
[s]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is
fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into
the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that
parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that
parent's children. 121
Similarly, in Wickham v. Byrne, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
chapter 750, act 5, section 607(b)(1) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes
was unconstitutional, as it infringed on parents' rights to make decisions
regarding their children's best interests. 122  The Wickham decision
consisted of a consolidated appeal of two cases in which a single
surviving parent sought to bar the parents of a deceased spouse from
obtaining visitation rights pursuant to section 607(b)(1).123 Previously,
in Lulay v. Lulay, the court held that the statute was unconstitutional as
applied where both parents sought to bar the visitation. 124
Specifically, in Wickham, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that
the right of a custodial parent to make decisions involving the best
interests of her child without undue state interference is constitutionally
mandated. 125 In doing so, the court relied on the United States Supreme
Court's pronouncement of policy concerning presumptions in favor of
the decision-making rights of parents set forth in Troxel. 126
Accordingly, the court invalidated section 607(b)(1) as unconstitutional
on its face, as it violated a parent's right to determine who his or her
child would visit:
119. Id. at 67.
120. Id. at 67-68.
121. Id. at 68-69.
122. Wickham v. Byrne, 769 N.E.2d 1, 8 (I11. 2002). In the Wickham petition, which was
consolidated with Langham v. Langham, 757 N.E.2d 505 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2001), upon
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the maternal grandmother sought visitation rights with her
granddaughter after her daughter had died. Id. at 2. The father objected and sought to dismiss the
petition, challenging the constitutionality of the Illinois grandparent visitation statute, relying on
the United States Supreme Court decision of Troxel and the Illinois Supreme Court decision of
Lulay v. Lulay. Id. (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57; Lulay v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521, 534 (I11.
2000)). The trial court denied the father's motion to dismiss and a hearing ensued. Id. at 3.
In Langham, the paternal grandparents sought visitation of their grandchildren from their
daughter-in-law after the death of their son. Id. After a full hearing, the trial court allowed
grandparent visitation. Id. at 4. The appellate court reversed, holding that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied. Id.
123. Id. at 2.
124. Lulay v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521, 534 (II1. 2000).
125. Wickham, 769 N.E.2d at 6-7.
126. Id. at 7.
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Section 607(b)(1) contains a similar flaw to the statute at issue in
Troxel. Section 607(b)(1) permits grandparents, great-grandparents,
or the sibling of any minor child visitation if "the court determines
that it is in the best interests and welfare of the child." Like the statute
in Troxel, section 607(b)(1), in every case, places the parent on equal
footing with the party seeking visitation rights. Further, like the
statute in Troxel, section 607(b)(1) directly contravenes the traditional
presumption that parents are fit and act in the best interests of their
children. The statute allows the "State to infringe on the fundamental
right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state
judge believes a 'better' decision could be made." Section 607(b)(1)
exposes the decision of a fit parent to the unfettered value judgment of
a judge and the intrusive micro managing of the state. 127
B. Constitutional Protections for Children
Children are persons with their own individual liberty and privacy
interests within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 128 As the
United States Supreme Court held in Levy v. Louisiana, in addition to
being afforded due process protection pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution, children are also "persons" within the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 129
In Weber v. Aetna Casualty, the Court struck down a Louisiana
statute based upon the Equal Protection Clause. 130  In Weber,
illegitimate children were again being treated differently than legitimate
children in a workmen's compensation benefit scheme. 131 Legitimate
children of a deceased parent received benefits from a deceased parent
as a priority, and illegitimate children only received benefits if any
benefits were left after distributions were made to the legitimate
children. 132 The Louisiana appellate and supreme courts affirmed the
127. Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
128. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (holding
that students in school as well as out of school are "persons" under the United States
Constitution). "Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights." Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1967) (ruling that neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights protect adults alone).
129. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968). In Levy, the United States Supreme Court
struck down a Louisiana statute that denied wrongful death benefits to illegitimate children. Id. at
72. In doing so, the Court held that the Louisiana statute, which classified illegitimate children as
ineligible to receive death benefits, discriminated against the children and the statute did not have
a rational relation to a legitimate state end. Id.
130. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972).
131. Id. at 167.
132. Id.
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legality of the statute, attempting to distinguish the Weber facts from the
facts in Levy, noting that illegitimate children were not denied benefits
as in Levy. 133 The United States Supreme Court reversed, indicating
that illegitimate as well as legitimate children suffer equal economic
loss from the death of a parent.' 34 Since the state had no legitimate
interest in classifying the children differently, the statute impermissibly
discriminated against the illegitimate children. 135 The Court cogently
noted that "the status of illegitimacy has expressed throughout the ages,
society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bounds of
marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is
illogical and unjust." 136
C. Constitutional Analysis of the Illinois Parentage Act
The fundamental constitutional question is whether a biological
parent is entitled to a relationship with his offspring when the
establishment of the relationship may harm the best interest of the child
and an intact family that has raised the child. Section 7 of the Illinois
Parentage Act, by allowing an automatic preference in favor of the
interloper, improperly and unconstitutionally chooses biology over all
other considerations. 137  As Justice Stewart wrote in his dissent in
Caban v. Mohammed:
Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection
between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring.
The mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental
relationship is clear. The validity of the father's parental claims must
be gauged by other measures. By tradition, the primary measure has
been the legitimate familial relationship he creates with the child by
marriage with the mother.... In some circumstances, the actual
relationship between father and child may suffice to create in
the... father parental interests .... 138
A careful review of constitutional law at the federal and state levels
establishes that while biological parents have rights, those rights are not
absolute. In Michael H., the United States Supreme Court indicated an
unequivocal preference for protection of the nuclear family over the
rights of a biological parent. 139 Also, in the United States Supreme
133. Id.
134. Id. at 169.
135. Id. at 173-174.
136. Id. at 175.
137. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7 (2002).
138. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 395 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
139. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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Court's decision in Troxel and the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in
Wickham, both courts indicated a preference for parental and familial
privacy over any rights of a biologically connected grandparent to
pursue a relationship with his or her progeny. 140 It is the family that is
the cornerstone of society, not the adulterer. In the zero-sum scheme
created by section 7, the legislature improperly has chosen the rights of
the adulterer over those of the family.
Not only is the statutory scheme here arguably unconstitutional, but it
also is no longer appropriate sociologically and scientifically.
Ironically, as the ability to prove a biological connection with a child
scientifically improves, case law is evolving in a direction that is less
concerned with the biological preference. For example, in In re
Parentage of M.J., the Illinois Supreme Court held that an individual
who intended to father the children born to his former girlfriend via
artificial insemination may have a duty to support those children
regardless of any biological connection. 141 That individual was not the
sperm donor, yet the court determined, as a matter of policy, that he
should not be excluded automatically from having a duty to support the
children. 142 The supreme court determined "that the best interests of
children and society are served by recognizing that parental
responsibility may be imposed on conduct evidencing actual consent to
the artificial insemination procedure." 143
As Professor Elizabeth Bartholet, an expert on civil rights and family
law at Harvard University Law School, stated in a paper presented at a
conference on Genetic Bonds and Family Law in New Orleans on
March 28, 2003:
Today the law appears to be moving in the direction of paying less and
less attention to biology as a key factor in defining parentage. There
has been increasing recognition in the law of existing social parenting
relationships and, alternatively, of intended future parenting
relationships, as important factors in determining parentage, factors
which may weigh equally with biology or may even outweigh biology,
depending on the situation. 144
140. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,68-69 (2000); Wickham v. Byrne, 769 N.E.2d 1, 6-7
(Ill. 2002).
141. In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (2003).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents 2-3 (Mar. 28, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript presented at the conference on Genetic Bonds and Family Law at the
University of Louisville Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy and Law, New Orleans, La., Mar.
28, 2003) (copy on file with author).
[Vol. 35
Illinois' Law of Parentage
In an era of increasing moral and legal complexity as a result of
technological advances in reproduction, biology is relatively
inconsequential. Intended parentage, not biology, is the predominant
determinant of parentage. 145 Individuals contract to obtain sperm, eggs,
the use of another's uterus, and so forth. It is not these biological
donors who are thought of as parents, but the contracting parties
intending to be recognized as parents. Again, Professor Bartholet
commented on the significance of these developments:
[I]n the reproductive technology world there is almost no public law
forbidding the sale of genetic material, pregnancy services and, after
the baby's birth, parental rights. There could be few stronger
statements as to the unimportance of biology to parenting in this
modem world of child production. 146
In such a complex era, it is simply wrong for a court to be divested of
the opportunity to determine parentage as a result of this statute, which
relies exclusively on biology as the sole determinant. In the words
attributed to Albert Einstein, "not everything that can be counted
counts, and not everything that counts can be counted.-
147
IV. EMERGING TRENDS AWAY FROM THE CULT OF BIOLOGY
Encouragingly, there has been a relatively recent exception made to
the legislature's absolutist notion that biology invariably determines
parentage. This exception is a practical resolution to real life
considerations and virtually was mandated by circumstances. The
exception involves the development of laws in response to a
catastrophic Illinois adoption case commonly known as the Baby
Richard case. 148  It took a screaming little boy to get lawmakers to
145. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REv. 2401, 2405
(1995).
Legal deference to the claims of biological parents recently has come under attack in
the courts, in the academic literature, and in the popular media. Cases such as the
highly publicized dispute between the DeBoers and Daniel Schmidt over the custody of
'Baby Jessica' contribute to a view that the law, frozen in ancient doctrine, accords
unwarranted legal protection to biological parents in ways that are both directly
harmful and symbolically corrosive to the interests of children.
Id.
146. Bartholet, supra note 144, at 3.
147. QUOTATIONS PAGECOM, QUOTATIONS BY ALBERT EINSTEIN, at http://
www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Albert_Einstein/31 (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
148. See In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Il1. 1994). In Doe, the Illinois Supreme Court
infamously returned a child to birth parents after being raised for four years by his adoptive
parents. See infra notes 151-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Baby Richard case).
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rethink their policies on parentage. 149  The amendments to the Illinois
Adoption Act were a practical response to public outcry demanding that
biological absolutism be tempered by commonsense. 150
The Putative Father Registry is a statutory amendment to the Illinois
Adoption Act in response to the Baby Richard litigation in 1994.151
The Baby Richard case involved a disastrous adoption proceeding that
became a prominent national news story and emphasized the traumatic
events of an adoption gone awry. 152 The matter resulted in the Illinois
Supreme Court invalidating an adoption and requiring a child who had
lived with adoptive parents his entire four years of life to be returned to
his biological father. 153
Both the trial court and appellate court in the Baby Richard case
denied the biological father's petition to vacate the adoption on the basis
that he had not shown a reasonable amount of interest in the child
during the first thirty days of the child's life. 154 The Illinois Supreme
Court reversed the trial court, holding that the father had possessed no
knowledge of the child and therefore could not have exercised his
parental rights. 155 The high court returned Richard at age four to his
149. The public furor over the results of the Baby Richard case included a public outcry for
the impeachment of Justice Heiple, the author of the decision. Jerome B. Meites & Steven F.
Pflaum, Commentary, Should Justice Heiple Be Impeached?, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 1997, at 13,
available at 1997 WL 3547371.
150. Andrew Fegelman, "Baby Richard' Law Is Put to Unexpected Use, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25,
1996, at 1, available at 1996 WL 2646821.
151. DCFS Establishes Paternity Registry, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 1994, at 3, available at 1994
WL 6560227; see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/12.1 (2002) (providing for the Putative Father
Registry). See generally Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (comprising of the Illinois Supreme
Court decision in the Baby Richard case).
152. Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 181-82.
153. Id. at 182-83. Richard lived with his adoptive parents from shortly after his birth until
the final resolution of the case. Id. at 181-82. The basic facts of the Baby Richard case were that
the child's mother told the father that the child had died at birth. Id. The mother had the child
placed for adoption. Id. at 181. Fifty-seven days after the child was born, the father discovered
that the child was in fact alive and petitioned the court for custody. Id. at 181-82.
154. id. at 181; see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1.D(I) (including in the definition of an "unfit
person" one who fails to maintain "a reasonable degree of interest" in his or her child in the
immediate thirty days following the child's birth); id § 50/8 (providing for an adoption without
the consent of the biological father where he is deemed an unfit person).
155. Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 181.
[T]o the extent that it is relevant to assign fault in this case, the fault here lies initially
with the mother, who fraudulently tried to deprive the father of his rights, and
secondly, with the adoptive parents and their attorney, who proceeded with the
adoption when they knew that a real father was out there who had been denied
knowledge of his baby's existence. When the father entered his appearance in the
adoption proceedings 57 days after the baby's birth and demanded his rights as a
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birth parents because of the biological relationship he shared with his
father, and because his mother had duped his father by convincing his
father that their child had died at birth. 156 Thus, the court removed the
child from the care of the only parents he had ever known.
157
Few who saw it will ever forget the indelible five o'clock news image
of Richard clutching his adoptive mother and then being carried away
from her, to be raised by strangers. 158 Clearly this was a troubling and
complex case with competing legal interests that deserved attention.
However, it was a terrorized little boy that grabbed the public's
attention. 159
As a result of the Baby Richard case, the public and the legislature
witnessed the horrific consequences of a statutory scheme that failed to
allow any considerations for the best interest of the child.16° In
response, the legislature and then-governor Jim Edgar took action to
avoid this type of problem in the future. A series of legislative
amendments were added to the Adoption Act that were designed to
avoid confusion and to expedite resolution of problems when they are
discovered. 161
A "Putative Father Registry" was developed and is administered by
the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services. 162 The statute
requires any putative or possible father to register with the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services no later than thirty days
after the birth of a child. 163 All registrations are to be in writing and
father, the petitioners should have relinquished the baby at that time. It was their
decision to prolong this litigation through a lengthy, and ultimately fruitless, appeal.
Id. at 182.
156. In an interesting twist, the mother who tricked the father later reconciled with the father
and actually got to raise Richard when he was returned to his biological father, despite the fact
that she started the tragic sequence of events. Id. at 188.
157. Id. at 182-83; see also In re Ashley K., 571 N.E.2d 905, 930-31 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1991) (finding that the trial court erred by returning a six-year-old to her birth parents more than
five years after residing with foster parents, without considering her best interests).
158. See Charles M. Madigan, "Richard" Case Reads Like a Novel, but for Those Involved-
Especially One Small Boy-It's Very Real, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 29, 1995, at 1, available at 1995 WL
6160832.
159. Bob Greene, Supreme Injustice for a Little Boy, CHI. TRIB., June 19, 1994, at 1, available
at 1994 WL 6169185.
160. See Gregory Kelson, In the Best Interest of the Child: What We Have Learned from Baby
Jessica and Baby Richard, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 353, 372 (2000) (discussing the need to use
the "best interests" standard).
161. See infra notes 162-78 and accompanying (discussing the changes to the Illinois
Adoption Act as a result of the Baby Richard case).
162. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/12.1 (2002).
163. Id. § 50/12.1(b).
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signed by the putative father. 164 If a putative father fails to register, he
is barred from bringing any action to assert any interest in the child. 165
Of significance, section 12.1(g) provides that "a lack of knowledge of
the pregnancy or birth is not an acceptable reason for failure to
register."' 166 Therefore, despite a biological connection, if a father does
not register, the child can be placed for adoption by the mother, and the
father has no claim to notice or any right to object or claim paternity
rights. While one could argue the harshness of the provisions regarding
the registry, the registry is the legislature's attempt to ensure that the
best interests of children take priority over biological connections and
hopefully avoid future trauma to other children. 167
Additionally, as a result of the Baby Richard case, the legislature
amended sections 20 and 20a of the Adoption Act to address and
respond to the disaster. 168 Section 20b was added July 3, 1994, to
provide that in the event that an adoption judgment is vacated, the court
is to conduct a best interest hearing to determine temporary and
permanent custody of the child. 169 The parties to the proceeding would
include the adoptive parents, biological parents whose parental rights
have not been terminated, and other parties being granted leave to
intervene.170
While the goal of the statute is to avoid Baby Richard-type problems,
section 20 has been construed to provide that the best interest hearing
should consider and apply the "superior rights doctrine," 17 1 which is a
legal presumption in favor of the biological parent. 172 In a rare turn of
events, it is the court and not the legislature that more strongly
advocates for biological parents' rights. Also, if the trial court were to
determine that a judgment for adoption is void ab initio because of lack
of jurisdiction or fraud, section 20 does not apply, and the child should
164. Id.
165. Id. § 50/12.1(g). An exception exists if a putative father can prove by clear and
convincing evidence that (1) it was not possible for him to register within the period of time
specified in subsection (b) of section 12.1, (2) his failure to register was through no fault of his
own, and (3) he registered within ten days after it became possible for him to file. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Act of July 3, 1994, Pub. Act No. 88-550, 1994 I11. Laws 369.
168. See Mahrukh S. Hussaini, Incorporating Thwarted Putative Fathers into the Adoption
Scheme: Illinois Proposes a Solution After the "Baby Richard Case," 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 189,
193, 211-12.
169. Act of July 3, 1994, § 20b, 1994 Ill. Laws at 411 (codified as amended at 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 50/20).
170. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/20.
171. In re Adoption of E.L., 733 N.E.2d 846, 863 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000).
172. Id. at 862-63.
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be returned automatically to the biological parent. 173 Accordingly, at
least one case has interpreted the statute to not permit the best interest
hearing if a biological father's interests, like those of Richard's
biological father, have been compromised through fraud. 174
Sections 20a and 20b are designed to emphatically direct courts to
construe the statute in favor of children: "The best interests and welfare
of the person to be adopted shall be of paramount consideration in the
construction and interpretation of this Act." 175 Section 20a discourages
continuances and directs that the Act be interpreted "so as not to result
in extending time limits beyond those set forth herein," 176 while section
20b limits the time period in which to challenge an adoption. 177
The development of the registry and the other post-Richard laws are
an implicit acknowledgment that biology cannot always be the sole
determinant of parentage. It was in response to the crisis of Baby
Richard that the Illinois legislature started to recognize that the old
DNA-based formula of determining parentage, exclusive of any
competing interests, does not always work in our modern society. 178 It
is a complex time, with society and science redefining themselves at
warp speed. The simple black and white notion of biology determining
parentage simply does not make sense in our modern world. A new
model is necessary and desirable.
V. THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF PARENTAGE
Two very distinct periods have preceded the present era regarding the
determination of parentage. The first era was the age of the
presumption. 179 The presumption was created as a practical formula to
determine paternity in an era that had no absolute means of establishing
parental identity. 180 Because of a lack of any alternative, parentage law
173. Id. at 861.
174. Id.
175. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/20a.
176. Id.
177. Id. § 50/20b.
A petition for relief from a final order or judgment entered in a proceeding under this
Act, after 30 days from the entry thereof under the provisions of Section 2-1401 of the
Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise must be filed no later than one year after the
entry of the order or judgment.
Id.
178. Id. § 50/20a.
179. See supra Part II.A (examining statutory presumptions of parentage).
180. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989) (plurality opinion).
The presumption of legitimacy was a fundamental principle of the common law.
Traditionally, that presumption could be rebutted only by proof that a husband was
2004]
836 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 35
has used presumptions to determine parentage by default in favor of the
husband of a married woman. 181 As aptly noted by Professors Mary
Anderlik and Mark Rothstein, "historically, the law has favored stability
over accuracy in attribution of paternity, but only in circumstances
where definitive proof of paternity or non-paternity was not
possible." 182
The history of the use of presumptions in favor of husbands against
claims of paternity of other men extends to England, where the
presumption was developed in the eighteenth century. 183  Lord
Mansfield's Rule, or the four-seas doctrine, thus provided that "if a
husband, not physically incapable, was within the four seas of England
during the period of gestation, the court would not listen to evidence
casting doubt on his paternity."' 184  The insignificance of biology in a
pre-scientific era lacking the ability to prove paternity paralleled
history's treatment of children as the property of their father (or their
mother's husband, as the case may have been).185
incapable of procreation or had had no access to his wife during the relevant period.
As explained by Blackstone, nonaccess could only be proved "if the husband be out of
the kingdom of England (or, as the law somewhat loosely phrases it, extra quatuor
maria [beyond the four seas]) for above nine months... " And, under the common
law both in England and here, "neither husband nor wife [could] be a witness to prove
access or nonaccess." The primary policy rationale underlying the common law's
severe restrictions on rebuttal of the presumption appears to have been an aversion to
declaring children illegitimate, thereby depriving them of rights of inheritance and
succession, and likely making them wards of the state. A secondary policy concern
was the interest in promoting the "peace and tranquility of States and families," a goal
that is obviously impaired by facilitating suits against husband and wife asserting that
their children are illegitimate. Even though, as bastardy laws became less harsh,
"[j]udges in both [England and the United States] gradually widened the acceptable
range of evidence that could be offered by spouses, and placed restraints on the 'four
seas rule' ... [,] the law retained a strong bias against ruling the children of married
women illegitimate."
Id. (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
181. Id. at 124 (plurality opinion) (stating that "[o]ur traditions have protected the marital
family").
182. Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-based Identity Testing and the Future of
the Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 222 (2002).
183. Id.
184. In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471,472 (N.Y. 1930).
185. See MURRAY, supra note 1, at 53.
If contemporary adoption laws tend to treat children as if they were the property of
their biological parents, Roman law was unabashedly straightforward about it. The
male Roman citizen was head of the family, the paterfamilias, and held near-absolute
authority over his children. The power of the patriarch was profound. All the property
of everyone in his power, which included his slaves as well as his children and the
2004] Illinois' Law of Parentage 837
The era of the presumption was succeeded by the era of science,
which allowed courts the ability to determine paternity with virtual
certainty. 186 The traditional presumption of legitimacy, while for the
most part a historical remnant of an earlier time, has remained in the
statute presumably because of the significant role it played formerly in
determining parentage. In reality, it has become irrelevant with the
advent of DNA-based paternity testing.
While the law has evolved in the sense that the "real" father can now
be determined through scientific means, it has remained consistent in its
treatment of children as property of their parents, as evidenced by the
absence of any considerations of their best interest in determining
parentage. Again, under the current Illinois scheme, if the DNA
indicates parentage, regardless of any competing interests, including the
child's interests, the claim to parentage is absolute. 187 The use of DNA-
based identity testing has become as oppressive in its absolutist reliance
on science as was the law's former reliance on presumptions.
Certain trends have developed with regard to identity testing using
DNA. While initially a costly and uncertain process, DNA testing today
has become sophisticated, accurate, and inexpensive. 188 Anderlik and
Rothstein have identified four social developments that have combined
to broaden the use of DNA testing, resulting in complications to
parentage determination. 189  Those developments include the Human
Genome Project, federal welfare policy, the father's rights movement,
and media interest in domestic drama. 190
The Human Genome Project has spun off technologies that allow for
inexpensive means to analyze DNA data.191 Formerly, a blood draw
was required to analyze DNA.192 Now, laboratories market themselves
children of his sons, legally belonged to him. He held the power of life and death over
his offspring no matter how old.
Id.
186. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 155 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In this day and age, however,
proving paternity by asking intimate and detailed questions about a couple's relationship would
be anachronistic. Who on earth would choose this method of establishing fatherhood when blood
tests prove it with far more certainty and far less fuss?").
187. See supra Part II (examining the Illinois Parentage Act, the use of DNA-based identity
testing, and cases addressing parentage).
188. Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 182, at 216.
189. Id. at 215-32.
190. Id. at 216-21.
191. Id. at 216.
192. See id. ("While testing at one time involved a blood draw, many laboratories that offer
testing by mail now use cheek swabs.").
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over the Internet as an inexpensive means to determine parentage. 193
These laboratories offer testing of hair without requiring the consent of
the person being tested.194 Testing also can be performed without the
knowledge or cooperation of the mother. 195 Accordingly, as a result of
the easy accessibility to testing, it has become common to determine
parentage through testing, where formerly, as a result of the exclusivity
of testing, many people otherwise would have neither the money nor the
inclination to use it.19
6
The next factor identified by Anderlik and Rothstein as contributing
to the expansion of DNA-based identity testing is federal welfare
policy. 197 Federal child support enforcement laws were created to
establish paternity and collect child support from putative fathers, thus
minimizing dependent mothers' reliance on welfare and state aid.' 98
Anderlik and Rothstein noted that the Family Support Act of 1988
required all parties in a contested paternity case to take a genetic test
and further obligated the federal government to pay ninety percent of
the testing costs. 199 They also noted that this federal emphasis on
genetic testing has made reliance on testing more acceptable in general:
[A]lthough the expansion of testing was initially in the service of the
mission of finding legal fathers for children who had none, the
technology is in no way restricted to that mission. The tests used to
prove genetic paternity can also be used to disprove genetic paternity.
Current law sends the message that genetic contribution to the creation
of a child through sexual intercourse, without any other kind of
connection to the child or the mother, is a sufficient basis for legal
fatherhood, with the attendant duty to provide financial support to the
child up to the age of eighteen and possibly beyond. With genetic
essentialism part of the cultural atmosphere, it is easy to slide into the
view that the genetic contribution is the essence of fatherhood. 200
The third contributing factor to the increased reliance on DNA-based
paternity testing is, according to Anderlik and Rothstein, the fathers'
rights movement. 20 1 Largely in response to a perceived bias against
193. Id. at 221 n.28.
194. Id. at 216.
195. Id. ("The testing of hair and other materials easily collected without the knowledge or
cooperation of the subject is also becoming more common.").
196. See id. (citing lower costs for DNA testing and increased media exposure),
197. See id. at 217.
198. Id. at 217-19.
199. Id. at 217-18; see Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
200. Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 182, at 218.
201. Id. at 219.
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fathers in contested custody cases, fathers' rights groups emerged in the
1970s, ostensibly to promote fathers' rights to parent. 20 2 Their agenda
has broadened and morphed into one of proclaiming male
victimization. 20 3 Many of the groups now lobby and advocate use of
genetic testing to disestablish paternity so that men may avoid raising
and supporting children who are not their biological progeny.
20 4
Clearly, if DNA can be used to establish paternity, logically, it could be
used to disestablish paternity. 20 5 Illinois' reliance on DNA testing is so
profound that the state even requires that a party disestablish paternity
through a DNA test prior to the filing of the petition to disestablish
paternity. 206
The final factor Anderlik and Rothstein point to in promulgating
reliance on DNA identity testing is the media interest in domestic
drama.20 7 "[M]edia attention, in conjunction with the marketing efforts
of laboratories, has contributed to the increasing demand for testing
sowing suspicion about paternity and fidelity and suggesting that testing
is a natural and acceptable response to suspicion. '"208 Our society has
become titillated by talk show themes of parentage and non-parentage,
and it stands to reason that when the American public is fed stories of
DNA defining parentage, that definition will seep into the national
consciousness.
While a DNA-based definition of parentage is a logical attempt to
define parentage scientifically, it is flawed when it is used as an
unqualified definition of paternity. As indicated above, no
consideration is made for the best interest of children.2°9 Interestingly,
and contradictorily, while no best interest hearing is allowed for either
the establishment or disestablishment of paternity, one is mandated for
support of terminating a natural parent's rights, even after a court has
found that the biological parents were guilty of abuse and/or neglect.2 10
Further, the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act is replete
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (noting two cases in which Illinois courts
determined that DNA testing was required prior to filing a petition to disestablish paternity).
207. Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 182, at 221.
208. Id.
209. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of the court to
determine the best interests of the child when DNA proves the biological parentage of the child).
210. In re Adoption of Syck, 562 N.E.2d 174, 183-84 (Ill. 1990).
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with considerations of the best interests of children in virtually all
disputes concerning children. 211
Exclusive reliance on science in paternity actions almost appears to
be akin to a child playing with a new toy to the exclusion of all of the
old toys, unconcerned with their former value. After centuries of
reliance on presumptive parentage, science has created an actual,
concrete means to ascertain paternity. Combining a culture that values
immediacy and certainty with the means of procuring that immediacy
and certainty has created a statutory scenario that needs to be
reexamined in light of both the current state of constitutional law and
sociological and commonsense considerations.
VI. A BETTER MODEL
In light of the aforesaid, what type of statutory model would
appropriately address the various competing interests in determining
parentage in this twenty-first century? In addressing this issue,
guidance can be had from antiquity. Aristotle, addressing human
excellence in Nicomachaen Ethics, defined "the ideal" as being a mean
point of excellence lying between two extremes. 212 Our legislature
must heed this wise proponent of equilibrium and draft legislation that
balances the rights inherent in biological relationships with those of the
family, ultimately culminating in considerations enhancing the best
interests of children.
Specifically, courts should be allowed to conduct a best interest
hearing to establish or disestablish paternity. Craig 0. Weber, in his
Comment, advocates a preliminary evidentiary hearing on whether the
paternity action is in the best interest of a child before allowing the
action to proceed. 2 13 Weber argues,
Requiring a preliminary hearing regarding the best interest of the child
prior to allowing a paternity action to proceed is the approach which
best balances all relevant considerations. Obviously, the paramount
consideration should be the child since it is his or her life which will
be impacted the most by a paternity action .... First, this hearing will
protect the child from unnecessary "bastardization" by preventing a
finding of illegitimacy unless it will result in a beneficial change in the
status quo to the child. Second, it will protect a natural father's rights
in raising his child if he is able to prove he is worthy of those rights.
211. See generally 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/101-5/802 (2002 & West Supp. 2003).
212. 2 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHAEN ETHICS, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.2.ii.
html (W.D. Ross trans., last modified Sept. 29, 2000).
213. Craig 0. Weber, Comment, Paternity Actions in Illinois: Why Not Consider What Is in
the Best Interest of the Child?, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 613, 628 (1997).
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Third, the hearing will protect the state's interest in assuring adequate
financial support for the child by not relieving the statutorily
presumed father of his obligations to the child by finding the child
illegitimate unless the alleged natural father can support the child.
Finally, it will protect the existing family unit from harmful
disruptions by nixing fruitless paternity actions before they seriously
damage existing relationships. 2 14
There is no logical or constitutional reason why a court cannot
conduct a best interest hearing prior to adjudicating parentage. While a
biological parent will assert an absolute right to a relationship, it should
be the court that acts as a gatekeeper for the child's interests, a role it
has assumed in virtually all other family law contests.215
Further, a statute could proscribe a statute of limitations to protect a
family from claims of biological fathers. To exclude a social father who
has raised a child for an extended period of time because of a lack of a
biological connection is an obscene disservice to both the child and the
man who has raised a child from birth. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, in
their landmark study that served as the basis for substantial court
consideration of custody issues,216 commented on the irrelevance of
biological connection for children:
Unlike adults, children have no psychological conception of
relationship by blood-tie until quite late in their development. For the
biological parents, the facts of having engendered, borne, or given
birth to a child produce an understandable sense of preparedness for
proprietorship and possessiveness. These considerations carry no
weight with children who are emotionally unaware of the events
leading to their births. What registers in their minds are the day-to-
day interchanges with the adults who take care of them and who, on
the strength of these, become the parent figures to whom they are
attached.217
Disestablishment of paternity poses a more complex circumstance
than a non-biological parent seeking to raise a child. While one can
impugn the integrity of an individual who raises a child for a decade and
then decides to disown the child because of a lack of a blood tie, this is
a circumstance that can and will exist in this era of cheap and easy DNA
testing. Accordingly, a more moderate approach, rejecting the current
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/101-5/802; Illinois Adoption Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/0.01-50/24 (2002).
216. Michael Grossberg, How to Give the Present a Past? Family Law in the United States
1950-2000, in CROSS CURRENTS: ANGLO-AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 1950-2000, at 1-29 (Sanford
N. Katz et al. eds., 2001).
217. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 12 (1973).
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model of absolute reliance on biology and adoption of an absolute
denial of disestablishment, is to allow disestablishment under certain
circumstances, which again would be focused largely on the best
interest of the child.
Also, in contrast to the current statute, a court decree or
acknowledgment of paternity should not be disregarded based upon a
DNA test disproving actual paternity. There simply do not seem to be
any adequate policy considerations for disregarding fundamental
notions of res judicata in circumstances of parentage. While a court
cannot force a relationship of love and affection, the court certainly can
enforce support orders if they are in the best interest of a child. This
scenario undoubtedly will seem unfair to the cuckolded husband who
raised a child only to discover later that the child is not his. However,
in an era in which a DNA test can be conducted quickly and
inexpensively, 218 one must question whether it is unfair that any doubts
be resolved sooner rather that later. Arguably, the historical
presumption of legitimacy should be irrebuttable in a disestablishment
context if it is not asserted prior to the development of a relationship
with a child.
VII. CONCLUSION
In relying on science to be the exclusive determinant of parentage,
our legislature has adhered to a false and misleading notion that defines
a parent by his bloodline. Such a notion is antiquated and dangerously
disregards children's interests. Principles such as these have to be
abandoned when they become irrelevant. Changing times require a new
philosophy reflective of society's development. In addition, the
statutory scheme arguably is unconstitutional in that it denies the family
due process rights of protection from undue state interference. By
utilizing a moderate approach of balancing the interests of the biological
versus social parent, the legislature could effectively promote and
enhance protection of children, which should be the predominant goal
of Illinois law. Virtually all family law statutes, except the current
Paternity Act, allow a trial court latitude to consider the best interests of
children. 219
While a biological connection to a child certainly is an important
factor in determining parentage, it should not be the sole determinant.
218. It is a whole other policy question whether DNA tests should be regulated and allowed
only under certain circumstances.
219. See supra note 215 (citing to examples of current Illinois statutes that allow courts to
consider a child's best interest).
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A parent-child relationship involves so much more than shared genes.
The bond of the parent and child is built on love, patience, nurturing,
and the time spent helping a child develop and thrive. A policy that
ignores this reality in favor of a sterile scientific certainty weakens this
sacred and permanent bond and devalues our society, which is based
upon these relationships. It is time for the legislature to recognize this
priority and act accordingly.
